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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of building fault-tolerant shared objects when processes can
crash and recover but lose their persistent state on recovery. This Diskless Crash-Recovery
(DCR) model matches the way many long-lived systems are built. We show that it presents
new challenges, as operations that are recorded at a quorum may not persist after some of the
processes in that quorum crash and then recover.
To address this problem, we introduce the notion of crash-consistent quorums, where no re-
coveries happen during the quorum responses. We show that relying on crash-consistent quorums
enables a recovery procedure that can recover all operations that successfully finished. Crash-
consistent quorums can be easily identified using a mechanism we term the crash vector, which
tracks the causal relationship between crashes, recoveries, and other operations.
We apply crash-consistent quorums and crash vectors to build two storage primitives. We
give a new algorithm for multi-writer, multi-reader atomic registers in the DCR model that
guarantees safety under all conditions and termination under a natural condition. It improves
on the best prior protocol for this problem by requiring fewer rounds, fewer nodes to participate
in the quorum, and a less restrictive liveness condition. We also present a more efficient single-
writer, single-reader atomic set – a virtual stable storage abstraction. It can be used to lift any
existing algorithm from the traditional Crash-Recovery model to the DCR model. We examine
a specific application, state machine replication, and show that existing diskless protocols can
violate their correctness guarantees, while ours offers a general and correct solution.
1998 ACM Subject Classification E.1 Distributed Data Structures, H.3.4 Distributed Systems
Keywords and phrases asynchronous system, fault-tolerance, crash-recovery, R/W register, state
machine replication
Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2017.36
∗ An extended version of this paper is available as a technical report [27].
† This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under award CNS-
1615102 and a Graduate Research Fellowship, and by gifts from Google and VMware.
© Ellis Michael, Dan R. K. Ports, Naveen Kr. Sharma, and Adriana Szekeres;
licensed under Creative Commons License CC-BY
31st International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2017).
Editor: Andréa W. Richa; Article No. 36; pp. 36:1–36:16
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Dagstuhl Publishing, Germany
36:2 Recovering Shared Objects Without Stable Storage
1 Introduction
Today’s distributed systems are key pieces of infrastructure that must remain available
even though the servers that implement them are constantly failing. These systems are
long-lived and must be able to tolerate nodes crashing and rejoining the system. In particular,
nodes must be able to rejoin the system even after losing their disk state, a real concern for
large-scale data centers where hard drive failures are a regular occurrence [7].
This paper addresses the problem of how to build recoverable shared objects even when
processes lose their entire state. We consider the Diskless Crash-Recovery model: each
process in the system may go down at any time; upon recovery, it loses all state it had
before the crash except for its identity. However, processes can run a recovery protocol to
reconstruct their state before deeming themselves operational again. This model matches
the way that many distributed systems are built in practice.
The Diskless Crash-Recovery model (DCR) is more challenging than the traditional
Crash-Stop model (CS) or the Crash-Recovery with Stable Storage model (CRSS). The main
challenge is that an invariant that holds at one process may not hold on that process’s next
incarnation after recovery. This leads to the problem of unstable quorums: it is possible
for a majority of processes to acknowledge a write operation, and yet processes can still
subsequently lose that knowledge after crash and recovery.
We provide a general mechanism for building recoverable shared objects in the DCR
model. We show that an operation can be made recoverable once it is stored by a crash-
consistent quorum, which we informally define as one where no recoveries happen during the
quorum responses. Crash-consistent quorums can be efficiently identified using a mechanism
called the crash vector : a vector, maintained by each process, that tracks the latest known
incarnation of each process. By including crash vectors in protocol messages, processes can
identify the causal relationship between crash recoveries and other operations. This makes it
possible to discard responses that are not part of a crash-consistent quorum. We show that
this is sufficient to make storage mechanisms recoverable.
The crash-consistent quorum approach is a general strategy for making storage primitives
recoverable. We give two concrete examples in this paper, both of which are always safe and
guarantee liveness during periods of stability; other storage primitives are also possible:
First, we build a multi-writer, multi-reader atomic register by extending the well-known
ABD protocol [3] with crash vectors. This improves on the best prior protocol by Konwar
et al. [17], RADON (S)R , for this problem: it requires fewer rounds (2 rather than 3),
requires fewer nodes to participate in the protocol (a simple majority vs 3/4), and has a
less restrictive liveness condition.
Second, we construct a single-writer, single-reader atomic set, which has weaker semantics
yet permits a more efficient implementation, requiring only a single round of communica-
tion for writes. We refer to this algorithm as virtual stable storage, as it offers consistency
semantics similar to a local disk. We show that the virtual stable storage protocol can be
used to transform any protocol that operates in the traditional CS or CRSS models to
one that operates in DCR.
We discuss the application of this work to state machine replication, a widely used
distributed system technique. Recovering from disk failures is an important concern in
practice, and recent replication protocols attempt to support recovery after complete loss
of state. Surprisingly, we find that each of the three such protocols [7, 16,22] can lose data.
We identify a general problem: while these protocols go to great lengths to ensure that a
recovering replica reconstructs the set of operations it previously processed, they fail to
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recover critical promises the replica has previously made, e.g., to elect a new leader. This
is due to the fact that these protocols rely on unstable quorums to persist these promises.
This causes nodes to break important invariants upon recovery, causing the system to violate
safety properties. Our approach provides a correct, general, and efficient solution.
To summarize, this paper makes the following contributions:
It formalizes a Diskless Crash-Recovery (DCR) failure model in a way that captures the
challenges of long-lived applications (Section 3).
It introduces the notion of crash-consistent quorums and provides two communication
primitives for reading from and writing to crash-consistent quorums (Section 4).
It presents algorithms built on top of our communications primitives for two different
shared objects in the DCR model: an atomic multi-writer, multi-reader register and an
atomic single-writer, single-reader set. The former is a general purpose register which
demonstrates the generality of our approach, while the latter provides a virtual stable
storage interface that can be used to port any protocol in the CRSS model to one for the
DCR model (Section 5).
Finally, it examines prior protocols for state machine replication in the DCR failure model
and demonstrates flaws in these protocols that lead to violations of safety properties. Our
two communication primitives can provide correct solutions (Section 6).
2 Background and Related Work
Static Systems. A static system comprises a fixed, finite set of processes. Fault-tolerant
protocols for reliable storage for static systems have been studied extensively in the Crash-Stop
(CS) failure model, where processes that fail never rejoin the system, and the Crash-Recovery
with Stable Storage model (CRSS). In the latter model, processes recover with the same state
after a crash. Consensus and related problems, in particular, have been studied extensively
in these settings [8, 12,30]. In CRSS, a crashed and recovered node is no different than one
which was temporarily unavailable; asynchronous algorithms that tolerate lossy networks are
inherently robust to these types of failures [8].
Prior work on fault-tolerant shared objects and consensus without stable storage generally
requires some subset of the processes to never fail [2, 11]. Aguilera et al. [2] showed an
impossibility result for a crash-recovery model: even with certain synchrony assumptions,
consensus cannot be solved without at least one process that never crashes. The main
differentiator between that work and this paper is that in their model, the states of processes
were binary – either “up” or “down.” We overcome this limitation by adding an extra
“recovering” state. As long as the number of processes which are “down” or “recovering” at
any given time is bounded, certain problems can be solved even without processes that never
fail.
Recently, Konwar et al. [17] presented a set of algorithms for implementing an atomic
multi-writer, multi-reader (MWMR) register in a model similar to ours. We generalize and
improve on this work using new primitives for crash-consistent quorums. Our techniques are
applicable to other forms of shared objects as well, and our MWMR register is more efficient:
it requires one fewer phase and a simple majority quorum (vs 3/4).
Several recent practical state machine replication systems [7,16,22] incorporate ad hoc
recovery mechanisms for nodes to recover from total disk loss. The common intuition behind
these approaches is that a write to disk can be replaced with a write to a quorum of other
nodes, recovering after a failure by performing a quorum read. However, we show that these
protocols are not correct; they can lose data in certain failure scenarios. A more recent
design, Replacement [13], provides a mechanism for replacing failed processes. Like our work
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and the epoch vectors in JPaxos [16], it draws on concepts like version vectors [31] and vector
clocks [9] to determine the causal dependencies between replacements and other operations.
We build on these techniques to provide generic communication primitives in DCR.
Dynamic Systems. In a dynamic setting, processes may leave or join the system at will.
Although we consider a static system, DCR may be viewed as a dynamic system with a
finite concurrency level [26], i.e, where there is a finite bound on the maximum number of
processes that are simultaneously active, over all runs. Here, a recovering process without
state is equivalent to a newly joined process.
Many dynamic systems implement reconfiguration protocols [1, 10, 21–24,33]. Reconfigu-
ration allows one to change the set of members allowed to participate in the computation.
This process allows both adding new processes and removing processes from the system.
Reconfiguration is a more general problem than recovery: it can be used to handle disk failure
by introducing a recovering node as a new member and removing its previous incarnation.
However, general reconfiguration protocols are a blunt instrument, as they must be able to
handle completely changing the membership to a disjoint set of processes . As a result, these
protocols are costly. Most use consensus to agree on the order of reconfigurations, which
delays the processing of concurrent operations [28]. DynaStore [1] is the first proposal which
does not require consensus, but reconfigurations can still delay R/W operations [28]. Smart-
Merge [14] improves on DynaStore by offering a more expressive reconfiguration interface.
Recovery is a special case of reconfiguration, where each recovering process replaces, and
has the same identity as, a previously crashed process. As a result, it permits more efficient
solutions.
Other protocols implement shared registers and other storage primitives in churn-prone
systems [4–6,15]. In these systems, processes are constantly joining and leaving the system,
but at a bounded rate. These protocols remain safe only when churn remains within the
specified bound, in contrast to our work which is always safe. Most of these protocols also
require synchrony assumptions for correctness. However, under these assumptions they are
able to provide liveness guarantees even during constant churn.
3 System Model
We begin by defining our failure model: Diskless Crash-Recovery (DCR), a variant of the
classic Crash-Recovery model where processes lose their entire state upon crashing.
We consider an asynchronous distributed system which consists of a fixed set of n
processes, Π. Each process has a unique name (identifier) of some kind; we assume processes
are numbered 1, . . . , n for simplicity. Each process executes a protocol (formally, it is an
I/O automaton [25]) while it is up. An execution of a protocol proceeds in discrete time
steps, numbered with N, starting at t = 0. At each step, at most one process either processes
an input action, processes a message, crashes, or restarts. If it crashes, the process stops
receiving messages and input actions, loses its state, and is considered down. A process that
is down can restart and transition back to the up state. We make the following assumptions
about a process that restarts: (1) it knows it is restarting, (2) it knows its unique name
and the names of the other processes in the system (i.e., this information survives crashes),
and (3) it can obtain an incarnation ID that is distinct from all the ones that it previously
obtained. Note that the incarnation ID need only be unique among different incarnations
of a specific process, not the entire system. These are reasonable assumptions to make for
real-world systems: (1) and (2) are fixed for a given deployment, and (3) can be obtained,
for example, from a source of randomness or the local processor clock.
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Processes are connected by an asynchronous network. Messages can be duplicated a finite
number of times or reordered arbitrarily – but not modified – by the network. We assume
that if an incarnation of a process remains up, sends a message, and an incarnation of the
destination process stays up long enough, that message will eventually be delivered.1
The unique incarnation ID makes it possible to distinguish different incarnations of the
same process. Without unique incarnation IDs, processes are vulnerable to “replay attacks:”
I Theorem 1. Any state reached by a process that has crashed, restarted, and taken steps
without receiving an input action or crashing again will always be reachable by that process.
Proof. Suppose process p has crashed, restarted, and taken some number of steps without
crashing or receiving an input action. That is, suppose that after it restarted, p received some
sequence of messages,M. Because p is an I/O automaton without access to randomness or
unique incarnation IDs, anytime p crashes and restarts, it restarts into the exact same state.
Furthermore, if p crashes, restarts, and receives the same sequence of messages,M, having
been duplicated by the network, p will always end up in the same state. J
A corollary to Theorem 1 is that any protocol in the DCR model without unique incarnation
IDs satisfying the safety properties of consensus – or even a simple shared object such as a
register – can reach a state from which terminating states are not reachable (i.e., a state
of deadlock). If all processes crash and recover before deciding a value or receiving a write,
they can always return to this earlier state, so the protocol cannot safely make progress.
For simplicity of exposition, we assume that the incarnation ID increases monotonically.
We explain in our technical report [27] how to eliminate this requirement.
A restarting process must recover parts of its state. To do so, it runs a distinct recovery
protocol. This protocol can communicate with other processes to recover previous state.
Once the recovery protocol terminates, the process declares recovery complete and resumes
execution of its normal protocol. We describe a process that is up as recovering if it is
running its recovery protocol and operational when it is running the initial automaton. A
protocol in this model should satisfy recovery termination: a recovering process eventually
becomes operational, as long as it does not crash again in the meantime. This precludes
vacuous solutions where recovering process never again participate in the normal protocol.
Using a separate recovery protocol matches the design of existing protocols like View-
stamped Replication [22]. Importantly, the distinction between recovering and opera-
tional allows failure bounds in terms of the number of operational processes, e.g., that
fewer than half of the processes can be either down or recovering at any moment. This
circumvents Aguilera et al.’s impossibility result for consensus [2], which does not make such
a distinction (i.e., restarting processes are immediately considered operational).
4 Achieving Crash-Consistent Quorums
Making shared objects recoverable in the DCR model requires a new type of quorum to
capture the idea of persistent, recoverable knowledge. A simple quorum does not suffice. We
demonstrate the problem through a simple straw-man example, and introduce the concepts
of crash-consistent quorums and crash vectors to solve the problem. We use these to build
generic quorum communication and recovery primitives.
1 This model is equivalent to one in which the network can drop any message a finite number of times,
with the added stipulation that processes resend messages until they are acknowledged.
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4.1 Unstable Quorums: Intuition
Consider an intentionally simple example: a fault-tolerant safe register that supports a
single writer and multiple readers. A safe register [19] is the weakest form of register, as
the behavior of READ operations is only defined when there are no concurrent WRITEs.
We further constrain the problem by allowing the writer to only ever execute one WRITE
operation. That is, the only safety requirement is that once the WRITE completes, all
subsequent READs that return must return the value written.
In the Crash-Stop model, a trivial quorum protocol suffices: WRITE(val) broadcasts val
and waits for acknowledgments from a quorum. Here, we consider majority quorums:
I Definition 2. A quorum Q is a set of processes such that Q ∈ Q = {Q : Q ∈ 2Π ∧ |Q| >
n/2}.
A subsequent READ would then be implemented by reading from a quorum. The quorum
intersection property (i.e., ∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q Q1 ∩Q2 6= {} ) guarantees that at least one process
will return val for a READ that happens after the WRITE. It is easy to extend this protocol
to the CRSS model simply by having each process log val to disk before replying to a WRITE.
Could we use this same quorum protocol in our DCR model, where processes that crash
recover without stable storage, by augmenting it with a recovery protocol that satisfies
recovery termination? In fact, for this particular protocol, there is no recovery protocol that
both guarantees the safety requirement and recovery termination – even if there is a majority
of processes which are operational at any instant! In order to tolerate the crashes of a
minority of processes and satisfy recovery termination, any recovery protocol must be able to
proceed after communicating with only a simple majority of processes. However, if a process
crashes in the middle of the WRITE procedure – after acknowledging val – it may recover
before a majority of processes have received val. No recovery procedure that communicates
only with this quorum of processes can cause the process to relearn val.
We term the resulting situation an unstable quorum: the WRITE operation received
responses from a quorum, and yet by the time it completes there may no longer exist a
majority of processes that know val. It is thus possible to form a quorum of processes that
either acknowledged val but then lost it during recovery, or never received the write request
(delayed by the network). A subsequent READ could fail by reading from such a quorum.
Although this is a simple example, many important systems suffer from precisely this
problem of unstable quorums. We show in Section 6 that essentially this scenario can cause
three different state machine replication protocols to lose important pieces of state.
4.2 Crash-Consistent Quorums
We can avoid this problem – both for the straw-man problem above and in the general case –
by relying not just on simple quorums of responses but crash-consistent ones.
Crash Consistency. We informally define a crash-consistent quorum to be one where no
recoveries of processes in the quorum happen during the quorum responses. More precisely:
I Definition 3. Let E be the set of all events in an execution. A set of events, E ⊆ E , is
crash-consistent if ∀e1, e2 ∈ E there is no e3 ∈ E that takes place at a later incarnation of
the same process as e1 such that e3 → e2. Here, → represents Lamport’s happens-before
relation [18].
In Section 4.3, we show how to build recoverable primitives using crash-consistent quorums,
in which all quorum replies (i.e. the message send events at a quorum) are crash-consistent.
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Crash Vectors. How does a process acquire a crash-consistent quorum of responses? The
mechanism that allows us to ensure a crash-consistent quorum is the crash vector. This
is a vector that contains, for each process, its latest known incarnation ID. Like a version
vector, processes attach their crash vector to the relevant protocol messages and use incoming
messages to update their crash vector. The crash vector thus tracks the causal relationship
between crash recoveries and other operations. When acquiring a quorum on a WRITE
operation, we check whether any of the crash vectors are inconsistent with each other,
indicating that a recovery may have happened concurrently with one of the responses. We
then discard any responses from previous incarnations of the recovering process, ensuring a
crash-consistent quorum, and thus avoiding the aforementioned problem.
4.3 Communication Primitives in DCR
We now describe in detail two generic quorum communication primitives, one of which acquires
a crash-consistent quorum, as well as a generic recovery procedure. These primitives require
their users to implement an abstract interface: Read-State, which returns a representation
of the state of the shared object; Update-State, which alters the current state with a
specific value; and Rebuild-State, which is called during recovery and takes a set of state
representations and combines them.
The Acquire-Quorum primitive writes a value to a crash-consistent quorum and returns
the latest state. The Read-Quorum primitive returns a fresh – but possibly inconsistent –
snapshot of the state as maintained at a quorum of processes. If Acquire-Quorum(val)
succeeds, then any subsequent Read-Quorum will return at least one response from a
process that knows (i.e., has previously updated its state with) val.
The detailed protocol implementing the two primitives and the recovery procedure is
presented as pseudo-code in Algorithm 1. We present the algorithm using a modified I/O
automaton notation. In our protocol, procedures are input actions that can be invoked
at any time (e.g., in a higher level protocol); functions are simple methods; and upon
clauses specify how processes handle external events (i.e., messages, system initialization, and
recovery). We use guards to prevent actions from being activated under certain conditions.
If the guard of a message handler or procedure is not satisfied, no action is taken, and the
message is not consumed (i.e., it remains in the network undelivered).
Each of the n process in Π maintains a crash vector, v, with one entry for each process in
the system. Entry i in this vector tracks the latest known incarnation ID of process i. During
an incarnation, a process numbers its acquire and read messages using the local variable
c to match messages with replies. When a process recovers, it gets a new value from its
local, monotonic clock and updates its incarnation ID in its own vector. When the recovery
procedure ends, the process becomes operational and signals this through the op flag. A
process’s crash vector is updated whenever a process learns about a newer incarnation of
another process. Crash vectors are partially ordered, and a join operation, denoted t, is
defined over vectors, where (v1 t v2)[i] = max(v1[i], v2[i]). Initially, each process’s crash
vector is [⊥, . . . ,⊥], where ⊥ is some value smaller than any incarnation ID.
The Acquire-Quorum function handles both writing values and recovering. Acquire-
Quorum ensures the persistence of both the process’s current crash vector – in particular
the process’s own incarnation ID in the vector – as well as the value to be written, val. It
provides these guarantees by collecting responses from a quorum of processes and ensuring
that those responses are crash-consistent. It uses crash vectors to detect when any process
that previously replied could have crashed and thus could have “forgotten” the written value.
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Algorithm 1 Communications primitives.
Permanent Local State:
n ∈ N+ . Number of processes
i ∈ [1, . . . , n] . Process number
Volatile Local State:
v ← [⊥ for i ∈ [1, . . . , n]] . Crash vector
op← false . Operational flag
R← {} . Reply set
c← 0 . Message number
1: upon System-Initialize
2: op← true
3: end upon
4: upon Recover
5: v[i]← Read-Clock
6: Σ← Acquire-Quorum(null)
7: Rebuild-State(Σ)
8: op← true
9: end upon
10: function Acquire-Quorum(val)
11: R← {}
12: c← c + 1
13: m← 〈acquire〉
14: m.c← c
15: m.val← val
16: for all j ∈ [1, . . . , n] do
17: Send-Message(m, j)
18: end for
19: Wait until |R| > n/2
20: return {m.s : m ∈ R}
21: end function
22: function Read-Quorum
23: R← {}
24: c← c + 1
25: m← 〈read〉
26: m.c← c
27: for all j ∈ [1, . . . , n] do
28: Send-Message(m, j)
29: end for
30: Wait until |R| > n/2
31: return {m.s : m ∈ R}
32: end function
33: function Send-Message(m, j)
34: m.f ← i . Sender
35: m.v ← v
36: Send m to process j
37: end function
38: upon receiving 〈acquire〉, m
39: guard: op
40: v ← v tm.v
41: m′ ← 〈acquire-rep〉
42: if m.val 6= null then
43: Update-State(m.val)
44: end if
45: m′.s← Read-State
46: m′.c← m.c
47: Send-Message(m′, m.f)
48: end upon
49: upon receiving 〈acquire-rep〉, m
50: guard: m.v[i] = v[i] ∧ c = m.c
51: v ← v tm.v
52: Add m to R
. Discard inconsistent, duplicate replies
53: while ∃m′ ∈ R where
54: m′.v[m′.f ] < v[m′.f ] do
55: Remove m′ from R
56: Resend 〈acquire〉 message to m′.f
57: end while
58: while ∃m′, m′′ ∈ R where
59: m′.f = m′′.f ∧m′ 6= m′′ do
60: Remove m′ from R
61: end while
62: end upon
63: upon receiving 〈read〉, m
64: guard: op
65: v ← v tm.v
66: m′ ← 〈read-rep〉
67: m′.s← Read-State
68: m′.c← m.c
69: Send-Message(m′, m.f)
70: end upon
71: upon receiving 〈read-rep〉, m
72: guard: m.v[i] = v[i] ∧ c = m.c
73: v ← v tm.v
74: Add m to R
75: end upon
4.4 Correctness
We show that our primitives provide the same safety properties as writing and reading to
simple quorums in the Crash-Stop model. First, we formally define quorum knowledge in
the DCR context.
I Definition 4 (Stable Properties). A predicate on the history of an incarnation of a process
(i.e., the sequence of events it has processed) is a stable property if it is monotonic (i.e., X
being true of history h implies that X is true of any history with h as a prefix).
I Definition 5. If stable property X is true of some incarnation of a process, p, we say that
incarnation of p knows X.
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I Definition 6 (Quorum Knowledge). We say that a quorum Q knows stable property X if,
for all processes p ∈ Q, one of the following holds:
(1) p is down,
(2) p is operational and knows X, or
(3) p is recovering and either already knows X or will know X if and when it finishes
recovery.
In our analysis of Algorithm 1, we are concerned with knowledge of two types of stable
properties: knowledge of values and knowledge of incarnation IDs. An incarnation of a process
knows value val if it has either executed Update-State(val) or executed Rebuild-State
with an acquire-rep message in the reply set sent by a process which knew val. Knowledge
of a process’s incarnation ID, i, is the stable property of having an entry in a crash vector
for that process greater than or equal to i.
Next, we define crash-consistency on acquire-rep messages with crash vectors.
I Definition 7 (Crash Consistency). A set of acquire-rep messages R is crash-consistent if
∀s1, s2 ∈ R. s1.v[s2.f ] ≤ s2.v[s2.f ].
Note that Definition 7, phrased in terms of crash vectors, is equivalent to the sending events
of the acquire-rep messages being crash-consistent according to Definition 3.
I Definition 8 (Quorum Promise). We say that a crash-consistent set of acquire-rep
messages constitutes a quorum promise for stable property X if the set of senders of those
messages is a quorum, and each sender knew X when it sent the message.
I Definition 9. If process p sent one of the acquire-rep message belonging to a quorum
promise received by some process, we say that p participated in that quorum promise.
The post-condition of the loop on line 53 guarantees the crash-consistency of the reply set
by discarding any inconsistent messages; the next loop guarantees that there is at most one
message from each process in the reply set. Therefore, the termination of Acquire-Quorum
(line 10) implies that the process has received a quorum promise showing that val was written
and that every participant had a crash vector greater than or equal to its own vector when
it sent the acquire message. This implies that whenever a process finishes recovery, it
must have received a quorum promise showing that the participants in its recovery had that
process’s latest incarnation ID in their crash vectors.
Unlike having a stable property, that a process participated in a quorum promise holds
across failures and recoveries. That is, we say that a process, not a specific incarnation of
that process, participated in a quorum promise. Also note that only operational processes
ever participate in a quorum promise, guaranteed by the guard on the acquire message
handler.
4.4.1 Safety
Finally, we are ready to state the main safety properties of our generic read/write primitives.
I Theorem 10 (Persistence of Quorum Knowledge). If at time t, some quorum, Q, knows
stable property X, then for all times t′ ≥ t, Q knows X.
Proof. We prove by strong induction on t′ that the following invariant, I, holds for all t′ ≥ t:
For all p in Q: (1) p is operational and knows X, (2) p is recovering, or (3) p is down.
In the base case at time t, Q knows X by assumption, so I holds.
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Now, assuming I holds at all times t′ − 1 ≥ t, we show that I holds at time t′. The only
step any process p ∈ Q could take to falsify I is finishing recovery. If recovery began at or
before time t, then because Q knew X, p must know X now that it has finished recovering.
Otherwise, if it began after time t, then p must have received some set of acquire-rep
messages from a quorum, all of which were sent after time t. By quorum intersection, one
of these messages must have come from some process in Q. Call this process q. Since q’s
acquire-rep message, m, was sent after time t and before t′, by the induction hypothesis,
q must have known X when it sent m. Therefore, p must know X upon finishing recovery
since it updates its crash vector and rebuilds its state using m.
Since I holds for all times t′ ≥ t, this implies the theorem. J
I Theorem 11 (Acquisition of Quorum Knowledge). If process p receives a quorum promise
for stable property X from quorum Q, then Q knows X.
Proof. We again prove this theorem by (strong) induction, showing that the following
invariant, I, holds for all times, t:
1. If a process receives a quorum promise for stable property X from quorum Q, then Q
knows X.
2. If process p ever participated in a quorum promise for X at or before time t, and p is
operational, then p knows X.
I holds vacuously at t = 0. We show that if I holds at time t− 1, it holds at time t:
First, we consider part 1 of I. If p has received a quorum promise, R, from quorum Q for
X, then because R is crash-consistent, we know that at the time they participated in R no
process in Q had participated in the recovery of any later incarnation of any other process in
Q than the one that participated in R. If they had, then by the induction hypothesis, such a
process would have known the recovered process’s new incarnation ID when it participated
in R, and R would not have been crash-consistent.
Given that fact, we will use a secondary induction to show that for all times, t′, all of the
processes in Q either:
(1) haven’t yet participated in R,
(2) are down,
(3) are recovering, or
(4) are operational and know X.
In the base case, no process in Q has yet participated in R. For the inductive step, note that
the only step any process q could take that would falsify our invariant is transitioning from
recovering to operational after having participated in R. If q finished recovering, it must
have received a quorum promise showing that the senders knew its new incarnation ID. By
quorum intersection, at least one of these came from some process r ∈ Q. We already know
r couldn’t have participated in q’s recovery before participating in R. So by the induction
hypothesis, r knew X at the time it participated in q’s recovery. Because knowledge of values
and incarnation IDs is transferred through acquire-rep messages, q knows X, completing
this secondary induction.
Finally, we know that since p has received R at time t, all of the process in Q have already
participated in R, so all of the processes in Q are either down, recovering (and will know
X upon finishing recovery), or are operational and know X. Therefore, Q knows X, and
this completes the proof that part 1 of I holds at time t.
Now, we consider part 2 of I. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that p is operational
at time t and doesn’t know X, but participated in quorum promise R for X at or before
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time t. Let Q be the set of processes participating in R. Since p does not know X, p must
have crashed and recovered since participating in R. Consider p’s most recent recovery, and
let the quorum promise it received showing that the senders knew p’s new incarnation ID (or
a greater one) be R′. Let the set of participants in R′ be Q′. By quorum intersection, there
exists some r ∈ Q ∩Q′.
It must be the case that r participated in R′ before R; otherwise by induction, when
r participated in R′, it would have known X, and then transferred that knowledge to the
current incarnation of p (at time t). r couldn’t have participated in R before time t, because
then by part 2 of I, it would have known p’s latest incarnation ID when participating in R,
violating the consistency of R. However, r cannot participate in R at or after time t, either.
Because p has received a quorum promise for its new incarnation ID at or before time t, by
part 1 of I, Q′ knows p’s new incarnation ID. By Theorem 10, Q′ continues to know this at
all later times. Because r ∈ Q′, it must know p’s incarnation ID, and thus cannot participate
in R without violating its crash-consistency. This contradicts the fact that r participates in
R and completes the proof that part 2 holds at time t. J
Since Acquire-Quorum(val) obtains a quorum promise for val, Theorem 11 implies
quorum knowledge of val, and Theorem 10 shows that that knowledge will persist for all
future time, subsequent Acquire-Quorums and Read-Quorums will get a response from
a process which knows val.
4.4.2 Liveness
Acquire-Quorum and Read-Quorum terminate if there is some quorum of processes that
all remain operational for a sufficient period of time.2 This is easy to see since a writing
or recovering process will eventually get an acquire-rep from each of these operational
processes, and those replies must be crash-consistent. Note that the termination of Acquire-
Quorum implies the termination of the recovery procedure, Recover. Therefore, the same
liveness conditions are required for Acquire-Quorum and for recovery termination.
We define a sufficient liveness condition, LC, below. It is a slightly weaker version of
the network stability condition N2 from [17]: the period in which processes must remain
operational is shorter.
I Definition 12 (Liveness Condition (LC)). Consider a process p executing either the
Acquire-Quorum or Read-Quorum function, φ, and consider the following statements:
1. There exists a quorum of processes, Q, all of which consume their respective messages
sent from φ.
2. Every process in Q either
a. remains operational during the interval [T1, T2], where T1 is the point in time
at which φ was invoked and T2 the earliest point in time at which p completes the
consumption of all the responses sent by the processes in Q or
b. becomes down and remains down during the same interval after p consumed its
response.
If these two statements are true for every invocation of a Acquire-Quorum or Read-
Quorum function, then we say that LC is satisfied.
2 We assume that the application-provided Read-State, Update-State, and Rebuild-State functions
execute entirely locally and do not block.
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Our protocol implementing the group communication primitives is live if LC is satisfied. For
LC to be satisfied, it is necessary that at most a minority of processes are down at any
given time. Otherwise, no process can ever receive replies from a quorum again.
5 Recoverable Shared Objects in DCR
In this section we demonstrate the benefits of our quorum communication primitives for DCR:
generality and efficiency. We present protocols for two different shared objects: a multi-writer,
multi-reader (MWMR) atomic register and a single-writer, single-reader (SWSR) atomic set.
In both protocols, Read and Write are intended to be invoked serially.
The first protocol implements a shared, fault-tolerant MWMR atomic register in DCR. It
is more efficient and has better liveness conditions than prior work. The second protocol
implements a weaker abstraction – a shared, fault-tolerant SWSR atomic set. We use this
set as a basic storage primitive to provide processes with access to their own virtual stable
storage (VSS), an emulation of a local disk. This enables easy migration of protocols to DCR.
5.1 Multi-writer, Multi-reader Atomic Register
We present a protocol for implementing a fault-tolerant, recoverable multi-writer, multi-
reader (MWMR) atomic register in DCR, which guarantees the linearizability of Reads
and Writes [19]. Our protocol is similar to the ABD protocol [3] but augments it with
a recovery procedure. Its pseudo-code is presented in Algorithm 2. Timestamps are used
for version control, as in the original protocol. A timestamp is defined as a triple (z, i, v[i]),
where z ∈ N , i ∈ [1..n] is the ID of the writing process, and v[i] is the incarnation ID of that
process. Timestamps are ordered lexicographically. By replacing each quorum write phase
in the original protocol with our Acquire-Quorum function and each quorum read phase
with Read-Quorum, we guarantee that every successful write phase is visible to subsequent
read phases, despite concurrent crashes and recoveries, thus preserving safety in DCR. The
Rebuild-State function reconstructs a value of the register at least as new as the one of
the last successful write that finished before the process crashed.
Discussion. The most recent protocol for fault-tolerant, recoverable, MWMR atomic reg-
isters is RADON [17]. The always-safe version of RADON , RADON (S)R , introduces an
additional communication phase after each quorum write to check whether any of the pro-
cesses that acknowledged the write crashed in the meantime. This increases the latency
of both the Read and Write procedures. Also, our liveness conditions are weaker: our
protocol is live if any majority of processes do not crash for a sufficient period of time, while
RADON
(S)
R requires a supermajority (3/4) of processes to not crash.
5.2 Virtual Stable Storage
Algorithm 3 presents a protocol for a fault-tolerant, recoverable, SWSR set, where the reader
is the same as the writer. It guarantees that the values written by completed Writes and
those returned in Reads are returned in subsequent Reads. Given the group communication
primitives, its implementation is straightforward; the only additional detail is that values
read during recovery should be written back to ensure atomicity (line 17).
Discussion. We can use this set to provide a virtual stable storage abstraction. It is well
known that any correct protocol in CS can be transformed into a correct protocol in the
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Algorithm 2 Multi-writer, multi-reader atomic register in Diskless Crash-Recovery.
Volatile Local State:
(t, d)← (t0, d0) . Value of register
1: procedure Write(dnew)
2: guard: op
. Get latest timestamp
3: Σ← Read-Quorum
4: (tmax, dmax)← max(Σ)
. Write value
5: tnew ← (tmax.z + 1, i, v[i])
6: Acquire-Quorum((tnew, dnew))
7: end procedure
8: procedure Read
9: guard: op
. Get latest register value
10: Σ← Read-Quorum
11: (tmax, dmax)← max(Σ)
. Write latest register value
12: Acquire-Quorum((tmax, dmax))
13: return dmax
14: end procedure
15: function Update-State(val)
16: if val.t > t then
17: (t, d)← val
18: end if
19: end function
20: function Read-State
21: return (t, d)
22: end function
23: function Rebuild-State(Σ)
24: (t, d)← max(Σ)
25: end function
Algorithm 3 Single writer, single reader atomic set in Diskless Crash-Recovery.
Permanent Local State:
owner . Owner of set flag
Volatile Local State:
S ← {} . Local set
1: procedure Write(s)
2: guard: op ∧ owner
3: Acquire-Quorum({s})
4: S ← S ∪ {s}
5: end procedure
6: procedure Read
7: guard: op ∧ owner
8: return S
9: end procedure
10: function Update-State(val)
11: S ← S ∪ val
12: end function
13: function Read-State
14: return S
15: end function
16: function Rebuild-State(Σ)
17: Acquire-Quorum(Σ)
18: S ←
⋃
Σ
19: end function
CRSS model by having processes write every message they receive (or the analogous state
update) to their local disk before sending a reply. By equipping each process with VSS, any
correct protocol in the CRSS model can then be converted into a safe protocol in the DCR
model, wherein processes write to crash-consistent quorums instead of stable storage.
6 Recoverable Replicated State Machines in DCR
We further extend our study of DCR to another specific problem: state machine replication
(SMR). SMR is a classic approach for building fault-tolerant services [18,32] that calls for the
service to be modeled as a deterministic state machine, replicated over a group of replicas.
System correctness requires each replica to execute the same set of operations in the same
order, even as replicas and network links fail. This is typically achieved using a consensus-
based replication protocol such as Multi-Paxos [20] or Viewstamped Replication [22,29] to
establish a global order of client requests.
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We examined three diskless recovery protocols for SMR: Viewstamped Replication [22],
Paxos Made Live [7], and JPaxos [16]. We found that each of these protocols suffers from the
problem illustrated in the example at the beginning of Section 4: they use regular quorums of
responses (instead of crash-consistent ones) when persisting critical data, which could violate
their invariants. This can lead to operations being lost, or different operations being executed
at different replicas, both serious correctness violations. We provide here brief explanations
of the problems in each of these protocols. For more details on how the protocols work and
complete traces, see our technical report [27].
Viewstamped Replication [29] is the first consensus-based SMR protocol. The original
version of the protocol requires a single write to disk, during a view change. A recent VR
variant [22] replaces the write to disk with a write to a quorum of replicas, in an attempt to
eliminate the necessity for disks. However, it uses simple quorum responses, allowing the
recovering replica to violate an important invariant: once a replica committed to take part
in a new view, it will never operate in a lower view. As a result, an operation can complete
successfully and then be lost after a view change.
Paxos Made Live [7] is Google’s Multi-Paxos implementation. To handle corrupted
disks, it lets a replica rejoin the system without its previous state and runs an (unspecified)
recovery protocol to restore the application state. The replica must then wait to observe
a full instance of successful consensus before participating. This successfully prevents the
replica from accepting multiple values for the same instance (e.g., one before and one after the
crash). However, it does not prevent the replica from sending different promises (i.e., leader
change commitments) to potential new leaders, which can lead to a new leader deciding a
new value for a prior successful instance of consensus.
JPaxos [16], a hybrid of Multi-Paxos and VR, provides a variety of deployment options,
including a diskless one. Nodes in JPaxos maintain an epoch vector that tracks which nodes
have crashed and recovered to discard lost promises made by prior incarnations of recovered
nodes. However, like VR and PML, certain failures during node recovery can cause the
system to lose state and violate safety properties.
All of these protocols can be correctly migrated to DCR, with little effort, using VSS
write operations, as explained in Section 5.2. This approach is straightforward, efficient, and
requires no invasive protocol modifications.
7 Conclusion
This paper examined the Diskless Crash-Recovery model, where process can crash and recover
but lose their state. We show how to provide persistence guarantees in this model using
new quorum primitives that write to and read from crash-consistent quorums. These general
primitives allow us to construct shared objects in the DCR model. In particular, we show a
MWMR atomic register protocol requiring fewer communication rounds and weaker liveness
assumptions than the best prior work. We also build a SWSR atomic set that can be used
to provide each process with virtual stable storage, which can be used to easily migrate any
protocol from traditional Crash-Recovery models to DCR.
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